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Attorney's Fees and Civil Code 1717
One-sided attorney's fee provisions' are a common feature of adhe-
sion form contracts.2 Civil Code Section 1717 was enacted in 1968 to
prevent oppressive use of these provisions by providing mutuality of
recovery of attorney's fees? Despite its noble motives and apparent
simplicity, this section has been the source of considerable confusion
and litigation in areas apparently not anticipated by the legislature.
This comment will examine the scope of Section 1717 as interpreted
by the California courts. These interpretations have involved four
questions: (1) To what types of litigation does the statute apply?
(2) To which contracts does it apply? (3) What kinds of judgments
will qualify a litigant as a "prevailing party" for the statute's purposes?
(4) When can persons not parties to the contract sued on claim the
statute's protection? This comment will begin with the law regarding
recovery of attorney's fees in contract actions and the frequent misuse
of that law via adhesion contracts. 4 An examination of the statute fol-
lows, focusing on legislative history and the mechanics of its operation.
After probing the scope of the statute, the comment will conclude with
legislative recommendations designed to correct the remaining uncer-
tainties and to fully implement the original intent of the legislature.
THE RIGHT TO RECOVER ATTORNEY'S FEES
A. Yhe American Rule
The traditional rule in America is that attorney's fees generally are
not recoverable as an element of costs.' This rule is codified in Califor-
nia in the Code of Civil Procedure.6 Although the legislature has
carved out many exceptions,' the rule has generally withstood the at-
1. A typical provision might read "In the event that Buyer defaults on the payments due
under this contract, Buyer agrees to pay all costs of collection, including reasonable attorney's
fees," with no provision for Buyer's attorney's fees incurred to enforce the warranty, etc.
2. Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 9 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Slawson].
3. See note 23 and accompanying text, infra.
4. See Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 596-97, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 (1971).
5. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 194 (1973). For a summary of the
arguments for and against the rule, see id. at 200-04.
6. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.
7. See Taylor, Resistance Stffens to Abandonment oftheAmerican Rule, 5 ORANGE COUNTY
B. J. 343, 350 (1978) (listing 52 statutory exceptions in California).
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tacks on it.' The Board of Bar Govenors had established a committee
to study proposals to change the rule, but abolished the committee in
1978.9 Even when the plaintiffs claim is fied in bad faith, the Califor-
nia courts have denied the defendant attorney's fees, holding that such
a change from the American rule is for the legislature alone to make. 0
Several reasons for the rule have been advanced by the California
courts.
The American rule is based upon the philosophy that 'one should not
be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and that
the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to
vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing includes the fees of
their opponents' counsel." 1
Conversely, it has been suggested that a broad policy of granting at-
torney's fees raises a "possibility that litigation might ensue for its own
sake,"' 2 and that a restrictive policy "avoid(s) the encouragement of
needless litigation and encourage(s) settlement."' 3 For whatever rea-
son, the American rule prevails in California, and the litigant seeking
reimbursement for fees must find an applicable exception.
B. The Contract Exception
Perhaps the largest exception to the American rule is that it can be
changed by "agreement, express or implied, of the parties."' 4 The
drafters of form contracts customarily include fee clauses in their
forms, generally benefitting only the person using the form.' 5
A chorus of commentators has questioned whether people who sign
form contracts are, in fact, agreeing to the terms as written.' 6 One
writer has suggested that the seller's representations, including adver-
tisements but not the boiler-plate form, constitute the actual agreement.
8. Young v. Redman, 55 Cal. App. 3d 827, 834-35, 128 Cal. Rptr. 86, 91 (1976). See, e.g.,
Taylor, It's Time to Allow Recovery of Attorney's Fees to the Prevailing Party in Any Civil Case, 2
ORANGE COUNTY B. J. 645 (1975).
9. Taylor, supra, note 344.
10. 55 Cal. App. 3d at 838-39, 128 CaL Rptr. at 93-94.
11. Id. at 835-36, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 91, (quoting Fleischmann Corp. v. Maier Brewing, 386
U.S. 714, 718 (1967)).
12. Sciarrotta v. Teaford Constr. Co. 110 Cal. App. 3d 444, 451, 167 Cal. Rptr. 889, 893
(1980). The contention is often scoffed at, but in at least one area it seems to be valid. One Mr.
Blau has apparently made a career out of litigating §16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See,
eg., Blau v. Lehman, 368 U.S. 403 (1962); Blau v. Lamb, 363 F.2d 507 (2d Cir., 1966); Blau v.
Max Factor & Co., 342 F.2d 304 (9th Cir., 1965); Blau v. Mission Corp. 212 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.,
1954).
13. 110 Cal. App. 3d at 452, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
14. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.
15. See System Inv. Corp. v. Union Bank, 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 163, 98 Cal. Rptr. 735, 752
(1971); Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 596, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 (1971).
16. See, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§1-3 (2d ed. 1977)
[hereinafter cited as CALAMARI & PERILLO]; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 370-
71 (1960); Slawson, supra note 2, at 3.
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This, in effect, implies that the parol evidence rule should be reversed
when applied to preprinted forms. 7
Even in cases tried prior to the effective date of Section 1717, the
courts found the necessity for softening the impact of one-sided attor-
ney's fee clauses. A contract provision placing the costs on one party
regardless of who brought the action, who made the action necessary,
or who prevailed in the action "would be contrary to public policy as
encouraging-and in fact indemnifying-vexatious or frivolous litiga-
tion."' 8 A literal application of the rule that attorney's fees are left to
the agreement of the parties'9 would give effect to such unconscionable
contract provisions, with disastrous results. In the event of any dispute,
the party benefitted by the provision could impose virtually any settle-
ment on the opposing party simply by threatening to raise the costs of
litigation above the amount in dispute.
In Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp. v. Howard IJ White, Inc.20 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court was faced with such an oppressive attorney's fee
clause. The Court avoided declaring the clause void by interpreting it,
contrary to the trial court's interpretation, as applying only to litigation
made necessary by the sub-contractor (the party required to bear the
expenses). In making this interpretation, the Court applied the general
rule of construction that ambiguities in the language of a contract will
be resolved against the party responsible for the ambiguity.2 In avoid-
ing mechanical application of both Section 1021 and oppressive attor-
ney's fee provisions, the Court recognized that superior bargaining
power at the time of the formation of the contract must not be allowed
to distort the judicial process by enabling one party to deny the other a
realistic opportunity to present his or her case. This same principle
applies when construing and applying Section 1717.22
C Civil Code Section 1717
In 1968, the legislature added Section 1717 to the Civil Code as fol-
lows: 23
In any action on a contract where such contract specifically pro-
17. Slawson, supra note 2, at 21.
18. Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp. v. Howard J. White, Inc., I Cal. 3d 266, 272, 461 P.2d 33, 36,
81 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852 (1969). The clause read "(s)hould litigation be necessary to enforce any
term or provision of this agreement, then all litigation and court costs and reasonable attorney's
fees shall be borne wholly by the Sub-Contractor." Id.
19. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §1021.
20. 1 Cal. 3d 266, 461 P.2d 33, 81 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1969).
21. Id. at 275, 461 P.2d at 39, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
22. International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218, 223-24, 577 P.2d 1031, 1034, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 691, 694 (1978).
23. CAL. STATS. 1968, c. 266, §1, at 578.
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vides that attorney's fees and costs, which are incurred to enforce the
provisions of such contract, shall be awarded to one of the parties,
the prevailing party, whether he is the party specified in the contract
or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees in addition to
necessary costs and disbursements.
Attorney's fees provided for by this section shall not be subject to
waiver by the parties to any contract which is entered into after the
effective date of this section. Any provision in any such contract
which provides for a waiver of attorney's fees is void.
As used in this section "prevailing party" means the party in
whose favor final judgment is rendered.
Examination of the text of the statute raises some interesting ques-
tions. The section is applicable if the contract provides attorney's fees
to "one of the parties." Does "one" mean "only one" or "one or
more?"'24 The word "reasonable" was added by the Senate.2 What
happens if the contract provision provides more or less than is "reason-
able?" 26
The definition of "prevailing" was changed by the Assembly Judici-
ary Committee; at the same time amendments in the bill to Civil Code
Sections 1811.1 and 2983.4, which are also attorney's fee provisions
containing definitions of "prevailing," were deleted. 27 Thus, it would
appear that the difference between the definition of "prevailing" in Sec-
tion 1717 and the definitions in the other sections was deliberate. The
latter sections provide:
When the defendant alleges in his answer that he tendered to the
plaintiff the full amount to which he was entitled and thereupon de-
posits in court, for the plaintiff, the amount so tendered, and the alle-
gation is found to be true, then the defendant is deemed to be a
prevailing party within the meaning of this article.
The bill was recommended for approval to then-Governor Reagan
by his legislative secretary. 28 The secretary's memorandum is virtually
the only available evidence of actual legislative intent.
The bill is intended to protect persons of limited means who sign
contracts with those in a superior bargaining position.
The bill was not actively opposed before any committees. How-
ever, the State Bar feels that the bill could create legal problems.29
Section 1717 addresses only the substantive right to recover fees and
24. See text accompanying notes 67-78 infra.
25. JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA SENATE 1814 (1968 Reg. Sess.).
26. See text accompanying notes 43-48 infra.
27. JOURNAL OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY 1426 (1968 Reg. Sess.).
28. Enrolled bill memorandum to governor, Assembly Bill No. 563, June 5, 1968 (chaptered
bill file 68-AB563, California State Archives) [hereinafter cited as Enrolled Bill Memorandum].
29. Enrolled Bill Memorandum, supra note 28.
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not the procedure for including them in the judgment. Prior to the
enactment of Section 1717, fees could be awarded as costs or as special
damages, depending on the source of the award, ie., whether author-
ized by statute or by contract.
ATTORNEY'S FEES AS DAMAGES AND COSTS
The traditional rule, both in California and elsewhere is that when
attorney's fees are recoverable on a contract, they are recoverable only
as special damages and not as costs.30 They must be pleaded in the
complaint and proved at trial.3' This is a cumbersome procedure, at
best. The party must prove the amount of attorney's fees at the very
time they are accruing. Both parties, in the case of a reciprocal clause,
must present their proof since it is not known at trial which party will
prevail. In a jury trial, the issue may distract the jury from the central
issues in the case.32
A simpler procedure is available for costs, including attorney's fees
authorized by statute. The prevailing attorney files a memorandum of
costs. 33 The other attorney may, if dissatisfied, file a motion to tax
costs. 34 The clerk or judge then includes the costs in the judgment. 35
Section 1717 is a statutory attorney's fee provision that is dependent
on a contractual provision. For the reasons noted above, the courts
prefer to treat attorney's fees as costs. In the early Section 1717 cases
which werefi/ed before the section took effect but tried afterward, treat-
ing the fees as costs was necessary in order to apply the statute at all.
The court in System Investment Corp. v. Union Bank36 looked at other
statutes authorizing attorney's fees37 and noted that the fees were
treated as costs. Thus, it was established early that the party required
topay attorney's fees by a contract could recover them under the stat-
ute as costs.
A more difficult problem arises when the party originally benefitted
by the contract provision attempts to recover attorney's fees as costs
rather than damages. Neither the legislative history of the statute nor a
reading of the section as a whole indicates a legislative intent to confer
any additional benefit on the party already benefitted by the contract
30. Genis v. Krasne, 47 Cal. 2d 241, 246, 302 P.2d 289, 292 (1956).
31. Id.
32. See generally Beneficial Standard Properties, Inc. v. Scharps, 67 Cal. App. 3d 227, 232,
136 Cal. Rptr. 549, 552 (1977).
33. CAL. Crw. PROC. CODE §1033.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 21 Cal. App. 3d 137, 98 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1971).
37. Id. at 162, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 752 (examining CAL CIV. PROC. CODE §§796, 836, 1255a).
Sections 796 and 1255a have since been repealed.
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provision.3" On the contrary, the statute was intended to reduce the
advantage obtained by superior bargaining power and to place the
weaker party on a more equal footing.39 However, the section clearly
states that "the prevailing party, whether he is the party specified in the
contract or not, shall be entitled to reasonable attorney's fees. .. .
The section does not, on its face, give the party specified in the contract
any greater substantive right than he or she had before. It would seem
that the legislature either did not consider the procedural difference, or
concluded that attorney's fees were better handled as costs in any case.
For whatever reason, when Section 1717 is applicable, a statutory
right to attorney's fees is given to both parties to the contract.41 There-
fore, either party can recover attorney's fees as costs. Apparently, this
leaves the party benefitted by the contract provision the option to re-
cover attorney's fees as costs or damages.42 As a practical matter, these
fees generally will be claimed as costs. The court must then determine
the amount of recovery allowed under Section 1717.
AMOUNT OF RECOVERY
Section 1717 provides for recovery of "reasonable" attorney's fees.
The section was intended to create a new substantive right for the ad-
hering party, ie., the one not benefitted by the contract provision.43
TED. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co.' recognized that the
section also created a statutory right for the party benefitted by the con-
tract provision.45 From this one might infer that either party to a con-
tract with a unilateral attorney's fee clause has a statutory right to
"reasonable" attorney's fees even if such fees are in excess of the
amount of fees specified in the contract. If such a result were allowed,
the adhering party might be held liable for even greater fees than those
for which he or she had contracted.
The California Supreme Court dispelled any such notions in Reyn-
olds Metals, Co. v. Alperson.4 The court decided that "the statutory
right should be no greater than the contractual right" by construing the
word "reasonable," in light of the legislative intent, as falling "within
38. See Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 596-97, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 (1971).
39. Id.; Enrolled Bill Memorandum, supra note 28.
40. CAL. CIV. CODE §1717 (emphasis added).
41. T. E. D. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 59, 63.64, 112 Cal. Rptr.
910, 913-14 (1974).
42. Id. at 64, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
43. 19 Cal. App. 3d at 596-97, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 39.
44. 38 Cal. App. 3d 59, 112 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1974).
45. Id. at 63-64, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 914.
46. 25 Cal. 3d 124, 599 P.2d 83, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1, (1979).
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the fundamental principle of reciprocity. '47 Since the promissory note
sued on in Reynolds Metals limited recovery of attorney's fees to 15% of
the amount of the note, defendants recovered only 15%.
In returning to the basic purpose of Section 1717 (to establish reci-
procity), the court limited the reach of TED. Bearing. Section 1717, as
interpreted by TED. Bearing, may remove a "procedural bar to recov-
ery of attorney('s) fees '4 8 as costs in some cases, but it does not create a
new substantive right for the party benefitted by the contract provision,
a right triggered by the contract but otherwise independent of it.
Before. any amount can be recovered under Section 1717, the party
seeking fees must show that the action, the contract, and the judgment
are all within the scope of the statute. The following three sections will
examine actions, contracts, and judgments which have been interpreted
in light of Section 1717. These are followed by three more sections
discussing the most vexing problem of the statute: its application to
persons alleged to be parties to the contract who prove that they are
not.
ACTIONS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE
By its terms, Section 1717 applies only to actions on contracts. Many
actions may be brought involving a contract other than the usual suits
for damages for breach or for specific performance. The plaintiff may
claim that the defendant has committed fraud in addition to breach of
contract; the defendant may claim misrepresentation as a defense.4 9 A
defaulting party may transfer assets to keep them out of the hands of
the plaintiff, creating a tort cause of action to set aside the transfer.50 A
party to a contract may exercise the right to rescind the contract and
sue for restitution.5 A landlord may sue for rent based on privity of
estate rather than privity of contract, although the amount of rent may
be fixed by a contract.52 A defendant, on the other hand, may defend
on the ground that the contract was never made, was made under du-
ress, or is illegal. 3
When fraud and contract causes of action are joined, the right to and
47. Id. at 130, 599 P.2d at 86, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 4.
48. International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218, 223, 577 P.2d 1031, 1034, 145 Cal. Rptr.
691, 694 (1978).
49. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 689 (4th ed. 1971).
50. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§3429-3440.
51. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 16, at §15-3.
52. See generally Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc., v. Wilkoski, 78 Cal. App. 3d 477, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 789 (1978).
53. See generally CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 16, at chs. 9, 22.
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the amount of the attorney's fees depend only on the contract action.
Thus, when plaintiffs prevail on a fraud theory and lose on a contract
theory, the defendant is the "prevailing party" for the purpose of Sec-
tion 1717. This occurred in Babcock v. Omans/y54 and can be a trap
for the unwary attorney. Leon Omansky had signed promissory notes
containing unilateral attorney's fee provisions. He transferred property
gratuitously and, the jury found, fraudulently, to his wife, Bertha. -
Plaintiffs brought suit to set aside the transfer and also alleged that
Bertha was a joint venturer and therefore was personally liable on the
notes.56 Ironically, Babcock obtained the relief he really wanted, a set-
ting aside of the transfer, but he was held liable for Mrs. Omansky's
attorney's fees57 due to an unnecessary, and apparently groundless, al-
legation in the complaint. When the contract action is questionable,
this trap can be avoided by naming the additional party on the tort
theory only, and then amending the complaint, through the use of a
Doe defendant, if subsequent discovery reveals the contract claim has
merit.
When a "total breach" of a contract has been committed, the ag-
grieved party has the right to cancel or rescind the contract 58 and seek
restitution of payment 9.5  Even though the contract has ceased to exist,
the action for restitution still is deemed to be an "action on a contract"
for the purposes of Section 171760 and the parallel provisions in Sec-
tions 2983.461 and 1811.1.62 This broad construction is necessary to
give buyers a choice of remedies without losing their right to attorney's
fees.
Similarly, a defendant who successfully established that there was no
enforceable contract could nevertheless recover,63 although a defendant
who established that the contract was unenforceable because it was ille-
gal was denied attorney's fees. 4 The explanation that "where neither
party can enforce the agreement there is no need for a mutual right to
attorney's fees"65 is unconvincing. Neither party can enforce a nonexis-
tent contract, either. A better ground for the distinction is the principle
54. 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1973).
55. Id. at 628, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 515.
56. Id. at 633, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
57. Id.
58. CAL. CIV. CODE §1689(b)(2).
59. CAL. CIV. CODE §1692; CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 16, at §15-3.
60. Leaf v. Phil Rauch, Inc., 47 Cal. App. 3d 371, 378-79, 120 Cal. Rptr. 749, 754 (1975).
61. Id.
62. Morgan v. Reasor Corp., 69 Cal. 2d 881, 896-97, 447 P.2d 638, 749, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 409
(1968).
63. Care Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Centers Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 701, 706, 126
Cal. Rptr. 761, 764 (1976).
64. Geffen v. Moss, 53 Cal. App. 3d 215, 227, 125 Cal. Rptr. 687, 694 (1975).
65. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 707, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
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that when the parties are inpari delicto the court will leave them as it
found them.6
If the action is one "on a contract" the contract must contain the type
of provision required for operation of Section 1717. The next section
examines the requirements relating to the contract itself.
CONTRACTS WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTE
When the contract provision provides for attorney's fees for one
party and not the other in any litigation concerning the contract, the
section obviously applies. When the clause.limits the rights of the
benefitted party or provides for recovery of attorney's fees by the other
party, however, the applicability of the section is not so clear.
4. Reciprocal Attorney's Fee Clauses
At first glance it would appear that Section 1717 simply makes all
unilateral clauses reciprocal. If so, its applicability to reciprocal clauses
would be irrelevant. This is not the case; a litigant may need to invoke
the statute, even when the clause is reciprocal by its terms, for two rea-
sons: (1) the prevailing party may need to recover fees as costs rather
than as damages' or (2) the defendant may have defended against the
contract action by proving that he or she was not a party to the con-
tract.68
The cases are in conflict regarding the section's applicability to con-
tracts containing reciprocal attorney's fee provisions. This conflict re-
sults from the requirement in Section 1717 that the contract provide
that fees "shall be awarded to one of the parties. '6 9 Does "one" mean
"one or more" or "one but not the other?" Courts that have considered
this point have deemed the answer obvious and devoted little discus-
sion to it. Unfortunately, different courts have come to opposite con-
clusions.
Bene cial Standard Properties, Inc. v. Schars 7° involved a lease pro-
viding for attorney's fees to the "successful" party. Both parties
pleaded attorney's fees but Beneficial apparently did not include them
as special damages in its successful motion for summary judgment.
Beneficial then attempted to recover its fees by including them in the
post-judgment memorandum of costs. 71 The trial court, applying the
66. CAL. CIV. CODE §3524.
67. See text accompanying notes 30-42 supra.
68. See text accompanying notes 114-155 infra.
69. CAL. CIV. CODE §1717 (emphasis added).
70. 67 Cal. App. 3d 227, 136 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1977).
71. Id. at 229, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 550.
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traditional contract rule,72 denied the fees on the ground that they were
not recoverable as costs, but only as special damages. The Court of
Appeal reversed and remanded the case for determination of the
amount.73 The opinion cites TED. Bearing for the proposition that
Section 1717 has broader application than traditionally ascribed to it,74
but never mentions the section's requirement that the contract provide
fees for "one of the parties."
Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc. v. Wilkoski75 also involved a lease
with a reciprocal provision. The court reviewed the purpose of the stat-
ute and declared "[i]t thus has no application to the case at bench in
which the provision in the lease itself is reciprocal. '7 6 The California
Supreme Court has also indicated, in another case,77 that the legislature
had no intent to change the rules regarding reciprocal clauses. "Section
1717 is obviously intended to create a reciprocal right to attorney's fees
when the contract provides the right to one party but not to the other. 78
TE.D. Bearing may be correct in extending the application of the
statute beyond its original purpose when the the literal language of the
statute requires it, but when the statutory language is ambiguous, refer-
ence to the purpose is essential. The legislative purpose was to correct
the injustices resulting from one-sided attorney's fee provisions. 79 How-
ever cumbersome the present procedure for recovering fees on a recip-
rocal clause may be, ie., as special damages rather than as costs, this
procedure may not be changed by distorting the intent of an unrelated
statute. The holding of Benefcial Standard, that Section 1717 applies
to reciprocal clauses, is erroneous and should be overruled.
If the clause itself meets the requirements of Section 1717, the next
question to consider is whether the clause applies to that portion of the
contract which is being litigated. If not, does Section 1717 nevertheless
provide for fees for the prevailing party?
B. Clauses Limited To a Part of the Contract
Rather than providing for attorney's fees for any litigation on the
contract, the drafter may provide for them only in the event litigation is
72. See note 30 and accompanying text, supra.
73. Beneficial Standard Properties, Inc. v. Scharps, 67 Cal. App. 3d at 232, 136 Cal. Rptr. at
552.
74. Id. at 231-32, 136 Cal. Rptr. at 551-52. Accord, Sain v. Silvestre, 78 Cal. App. 3d 461,
475-76, 144 Cal. Rptr. 478, 487-88 (1978) disapproved on other grounds, Reynolds Metals, Co. v.
Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 129, 599 P.2d 83, 86, 158 CaL Rptr. 1, 3 (1979).
75. 78 Cal. App. 3d 477, 143 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1978).
76. Id. at 485, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
77. International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218, 222-23, 577 P.2d 1031, 1033, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 691, 693 (1978).
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id.
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necessary to enforce particular rights of one party. In practice, of
course, these will necessarily be the rights of the party either retaining
the drafter or purchasing the form. If the other party, the "adhering
party" in the usual form contract case, then brings suit to enforce a
right not covered by the clause, can the prevailing party in that suit
recover attorney's fees? Does it matter whether the adhering party or
the drafting party prevails?
Attorney's fee clauses applicable to only part of the contract are uni-
lateral in an entirely different sense than those which provide that if A
prevails against B, B must pay A's fees but provide B no such right.
This latter kind of clause, unilateral on its face, was made reciprocal by
the statute in no uncertain terms. The effect of the statute on these
clauses is that in any one lawsuit one party cannot force the other party
into settlement with the one-way attorney's fee provision.
The attorney's fee provision in Sciarrotta v. Teaford Constr. Co.80
was unilateral in the sense that it provided for recovery of fees only by
the drafting party; but it was also one-sided in its applicability to only
one provision in the contract. The case involved a typical home con-
struction agreement using a printed form contract. The contractor
agreed to build the house according to certain plans and "in a substan-
tial and workmanlike manner.""1 The owners agreed to pay $46,400.82
The attorney's fee provision applied only in the event that the contrac-
tor had to sue the owners for breach of the obligation to pay.8 3 The
owners paid the full price, moved in, and later sued the contractor for
defective construction, i e., for breach of the covenant of workman-
ship.8 4
The majority in Sciarrotta concluded that public policy favored a
narrow construction of the section in this case." If the defendant con-
tractor had prevailed, the contract provision would not have been ap-
plicable. If Section 1717 does not apply in this case, because of the
limited scope of the contract fee clause, neither party can recover attor-
ney's fees. If the section does apply, both parties are potentially liable
for fees for which they never contracted. The majority noted the re-
strictions placed on Section 1717 by the Supreme Court86 and con-
cluded that "policy considerations actually militate against a broad
granting of attorney's fees in all instances to avoid the encouragement
80. 110 Cal. App. 3d 444, 167 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1980).
81. Id. at 446, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 890.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 452, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
86. Id. at 451, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
' 243
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of needless litigation and to encourage settlement." 7 The dissent re-
jected this logic, stating that this result "will effectively destroy the reci-
procity the legislature intended to achieve by enacting Section 1717.''s
The question is whether the legislature intended to achieve reciprocity
in terms of cases or in terms of contracts.
The efficacy of Section 1717 as a consumer protection measure has
been severely criticized because of the discretion it leaves the drafters
of form contracts regarding recovery of attorney's fees in actions to en-
force the contract.8 9 The plaintiff decides whether to have a dispute
settled in court. Apparently, therefore, plaintiffs generally expect that
they have a significantly better chance of prevailing than the defend-
ants. Since lenders and sellers on credit perform at the time the con-
tract is made and collect later, they are more likely to be plaintiffs. 90
Insurance companies, on the other hand, are paid in advance and per-
form much later, if ever, and are therefore more likely to be defend-
ants.9' In support of this criticism, Professor Slawson maintains that
"mass contractors" only include attorney's fee clauses in contracts that
they expect to enforce in court and omit them in contracts they expect
the consumer to enforce. 92
This power to select the application of Section 1717 will be greatly
expanded if the narrow construction in Sciarrotta is upheld in future
decisions. Section 1717 will become ineffective as a sword to enforce
consumer rights, although its use as a shield by consumer defendants
will continue. Was such a result intended by the legislature? A review
of the statute and of the cases suggests it was not.
The Sciarrotta decision is inconsistent with the well-settled rule of
Leaf v. PhilRauch, Inc.93 that a party who rescinds a contract is never-
theless entitled to attorney's fees under Section 1717. Rescission as a
remedy for a material breach is surely outside the scope of the typical
attorney's fee provision. It is a right implied by law, regardless of
whether it is stated in the contract.94 If the rationale of Sciarrotta were
followed, the plaintiff who has rescinded and is seeking restitution
would not be entitled to attorney's fees under Section 1717 since the
defendant would not be entitled to attorney's fees under the contract
because the suit is not one seeking enforcement of a provision in the
87. Id. at 452, 167 CaL Rptr. at 894.
88. Id. at 454, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
89. Slawson, supra note 2, at 9.
90. Slawson, supra note 2, at 9.
91. Slawson, supra note 2, at 9.
92. Slawson, supra note 2, at 9.
93. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
94. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
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contract. Yet the award of fees to the rescinding plaintiff was enthusi-
astically endorsed by the same court that decided Sciarrotta.95
By its terms, Section 1717 applies to "any action on a contract"96
with a certain type of attorney's fee provision. The section does not
limit its application to portions of a contract covered by the requisite
clause. In expressly prohibiting waiver of its provisions, the legislature
unambiguously declared its awareness that contract drafters would at-
tempt to defeat the section's purpose and also declared its intent that
the drafters should not be allowed to do so. Section 1717 "reflects legis-
lative intent that equitable considerations must prevail over both the
bargaining power of the parties and the technical rules of contractual
construction. 97 The consideration here is that "he who takes the bene-
fit must bear the burden."98 An attorney's fee provision applicable to a
promise is a benefit to the promisee, even if reciprocal. The promisee
who takes that benefit should shoulder the burden of a similar right
attached to the consideration given in return for the promise.
The majority in Sciarrotta noted that if the construction in the dis-
senting opinion were followed and the plaintiffs had lost, the plaintiffs
would be liable for attorney's fees in excess of their contractual obliga-
tion; they had not contracted to pay fees in the event they brought suit
and lost. An examination of Section 1717 in context with other provi-
sions of the Civil Code99 reveals that the legislature considered making
fees available to the prevailing party, whether buyer or seller, in certain
contract disputes, preferable to giving the drafter free rein to determine
the scope of recovery of attorney's fees. Unfortunately, the legislature
has not been so consistent in defining "prevailing party."
JUDGMENTS WITHIN THE SCOPE-WHO IS "PREVAILING?"
Obtaining a "final judgment" is a prerequisite to recovery under Sec-
tion 1717. A voluntary dismissal is not a final judgment for this pur-
pose. 1°° Unlike other attorney's fee provisions in the Civil Code, 01
Section 1717 contains no provision enabling a defendant to shift liabil-
ity for fees by depositing in court the amount not in dispute. This
omission by the legislature was apparently intentional. 2 A plaintiff
95. Care Constr., Inc. v. Century Convalescent Centers, Inc., 54 Cal. App. 3d 701, 705-06,
126 Cal. Rptr. 761, 763-64 (1976).
96. CAL. CIV. CODE §1717 (emphasis added).
97. International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218, 224,577 P.2d 1031, 1034, 145 Cal. Rptr.
691, 694 (1978).
98. CAL. CIV. CODE §3521.
99. Id. §§1811.1, 2983.4.
100. 21 Cal. 3d at 225, 577 P.2d at 1035, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
101. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1811.1, 2983.4.
102. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
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can refuse defendant's tender of an amount not in dispute, assuring a
final judgment for at least that amount. If the statute is interpreted
literally, this tactic would also assure the award of attorney's fees. This
is precisely the kind of oppressive use of attorney's fees that the statute
was intended to prevent. Moreover, if the action is on a retail install-
ment contract or on an automobile conditional sales contract, and if the
defendant has deposited in court an amount equal to or greater than
the plaintiff's judgment, the court might be faced with two "prevailing
parties," both entitled to attorney's fees under different statutes.
An excellent illustration of the problems with Section 1717's defini-
tion of "prevailing" was provided by National Computer Rental Ltd v.
Bergen Brunswig Corp103 Under a contract for rental of computer
equipment, plaintiff claimed three items of recovery: (1) $4,123.60 un-
paid rent; (2) $884 taxes; and (3) $22,100 fee for defendant's early ter-
mination of the contract." 4 Defendant, in answer, denied owing
anything, but later made an offer to settle for the unpaid rent alone. 105
Neither the rent nor the taxes were argued at trial. Plaintiff obtained a
judgment for the rent and taxes totalling $5007.60, but the trial court
awarded defendant $2000 attorney's fees under Section 1717 finding
that the defendant was the "prevailing party."'' 0 6
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed, 0 7 Justice Jefferson
dissenting.' Even the dissenting opinion did not suggest that the stat-
ute be interpreted literally by awarding fees to plaintiff simply because
plaintiff recovered a judgment. Instead, the dissent's position was that
since the plaintiff had recovered an amount greater than the amount
the defendant had offered, plaintiff was "the party in whose favor final
judgment is rendered."'" This interpretation is consistent with the leg-
islative policy on costs generally." 0 Application of the costs rule to this
case would have led to a very curious result. To award attorney's fees
to plaintiff instead of defendant would have increased the net judgment
by $4,000 1 because of defendant's failure to offer an additional $884-
less than a fourth of the total fees and only three percent of the plain-
tiff's total claim. Looking at the case as a whole, there is little doubt
that defendant "prevailed" as the word is commonly understood. The
103. 59 Cal. App. 3d 58, 130 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976).
104. Id. at 61, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
105. Id. at 63, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
106. Id. at 62, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
107. Id. at 63, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 70, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 367-68.
110. CAL. Cir. PRoc. CODE §998.
111. Assuming the parties have approximately equal attorney's fees of $2000 each, there is
$4000 at stake in determining which party will recover fees.
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majority took a common sense approach, but appears to have disre-
garded the language of the statute and to have taken some liberties
with the facts.
Defendant prevailed on the only issue in the case; it is the "prevail-
ing party" within the meaning of Section 1717, even though plaintiff
nominally holds a judgment for an amount never disputed and never
litigated. 112
Actually, the plaintiff held a judgment for nominally more than the
amount not in dispute. The Supreme Court later cited National Com-
puter for the proposition that "the form of the judgment is not neces-
sarily controlling, but must give way to equitable considerations."
'
"1 3
These "equitable considerations" have proved especially compelling
when a non-party to the contract is nonetheless sued as a party. The
next section will review the various legal theories by which a non-party
may become liable on a contract.
CONTRACT LIABILITY OF NON-SIGNATORIES
The most difficult aspect of Section 1717 has been its application to
cases when a person who did not sign the contract, at least not on his or
her own behalf, is nonetheless sought to be held liable. Can a party to
the litigation, the defendant, alleged to be a party or successor to a
party to the contract, successfully defend by proving he or she is not a
party to the contract and still invoke the protection of Section 1717?
Uncertainty as to parties may result from transactions involving succes-
sors to interests in land, agency, or corporations.
A. Interests in Land
Many contracts are made pursuant to a conveyance of an interest in
land. They include leases, security for loans, equitable servitudes, and
convenants running with the land. The latter were limited, at common
law, to covenants which "touch and concern the land."' 1 4 California's
codification of the rule requires that the covenant be "made for the
direct benefit of the property."' 5 Recovery of attorney's fees does not
benefit the property directly and therefore, arguably, cannot run with
the land at law.
112. 59 Cal. App. 3d at 63, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 363.
113. International Indus., Inc. v. Olen, 21 Cal. 3d 218, 224,577 P.2d 1031, 1034, 145 Cal. Rptr.
691, 694 (1978). The court did not state what these "equitable considerations" were, but appar-
ently was referring to a general sense of fairness as opposed to the application of rigid rules. The
result in this case is that the cost of the litigation falls on the party who made it necessary.
114. Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (1583).
115. CAL. CwV. CODE §1462 (emphasis added).
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Sain v. SilvestrelI 6 involved an attempt to enforce an equitable servi-
tude which included a reciprocal attorney's fee clause. The court did
not discuss whether the suit was an "action on a contract" for the pur-
poses of Section 1717. Equitable servitudes began with the Court of
Chancery's decision in Tulk v. MoxhayI 7 that equity could enjoin vio-
lation of an agreement by a successor to the promisor's interest without
regard to whether the covenant could run at law. l II With this historical
contract foundation, it seems reasonable to conclude that enforcement
of servitudes is within the scope of Section 1717.
The defendants in Sain established that their land was not subject to
the servitudes because their title was derived from a foreclosure of a
mortgage senior to the declaration of restrictions. 19 The court denied
them attorney's fees. "Defendants are not, however, parties to or priv-
ies to, the contractual provisions providing for attorney's fees ...
defendants, therefore, cannot be awarded such fees."'120
In Pas v. Hill,121 plaintiffs brought suit to enjoin acceleration of the
due date under a due-on-sale clause in a deed of trust 22 which was
executed concurrently with a promissory note by the plaintiffs' prede-
cessor in interest. The plaintiffs, not parties to the note, were not sub-
ject to personal liability on the note nor were they personally liable on
the attorney's fee provision. The court concluded that to allow plain-
tiffs to recover attorney's fees in this case would not further the intent
of Section 1717 to make attorney's fee obligations reciprocal; "on the
contrary, a unilateral right to recover attorney fees would have been
created in favor of the plaintiffs."'' 23
The decision in Pas v. Hill was based on the lack of plaintiffs' per-
sonal liability for attorney's fees.' 24 The decision did not address the
potential liability of plaintiffs'property for the fees. If the deed of trust
secured only the debt principal and interest, and not the original debt-
ors' promise to pay attorney's fees, then the decision would have been
unquestionably correct. But a secured party may recover attorney's
fees out of foreclosure sale proceeds when the mortgage or deed of trust
116. 78 Cal. App. 3d 461, 144 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1978), disapprovedinpart, Reynolds Metals, Co.
v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 599 P.2d 83, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979).
117. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
118. Id. at 1144-45.
119. 78 Cal. App. 3d at 472, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
120. Id. at 476, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 488. This holding of Sain was disapproved by Reynolds
Metals, Co. v. A/person, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 599 P.2d 83, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979).
121. 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98 (1978).
122. See generally Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 379 (1978).
123. 87 Cal. App. 3d at 536, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 108.
124. Id. at 533, 151 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
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so provides.'25 In times of escalating land values deficiencies are rare,
and the ability to recover fees out of the sale of property is equally as
detrimental to the property owner as would be a personal judgment.
The purposes of Section 1717 would be served better by allowing re-
covery in this situation. Taking these considerations into account, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal has apologetically overruled Pas v.
Hill.1
26
A similar case arose in a lease situation in Canal-Randolph Anaheim,
Inc. v. Wilkoski.'27 The lessee law firm dissolved, and one of its associ-
ates remained in occupancy.' 28 The landlord sued for allegedly unpaid
rent and the trial court, finding for the defendant, awarded attorney's
fees. The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed for two reasons.
First, the clause in the original lease was reciprocal; Section 1717 ap-
plies only to unilateral clauses.' 29 Second, defendant was not a party to
the contract and, unlike the non-party defendant in Babcock v. Oman-
sky, 130 was not alleged to have been a party. Had the plaintiff pre-
vailed, the court concluded, plaintiff could not have recovered
attorney's fees from the lease assignee (defendant).' 31 The result prob-
ably would be different if the assignee had formally assumed the lease,
expressly promising to fulfill all of the covenants of the original tenant.
When a lease has been assumed, a suit to recover rent is an action on a
contract, actually two contracts, and Section 1717 would apply. Appar-
ently, the result in Canal-Randolph rests on the lack of an assumption
of the lease.
B. Agency
A second way persons other than signatories may be held liable on
contract obligations is based on agency law. In Babcock v. Oman-
sky,132 the plaintiff, in addition to his tort causes of action, alleged that
Bertha and Leon Omansky were each other's agents, and that they
were partners and joint venturers. 33 Bertha won an order of nonsuit
on the contract allegations with an award of attorney's fees. The court
stated that Section 1717 "expressly indicates" that non-signatories to
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §726.
126. Saucedo v. Mercury Savings and Loan Assoc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 309, 315, 168 Cal. Rptr.
552, 555-56 (1980).
127. 78 Cal. App. 3d 477, 143 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1978).
128. Id. at 483, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
129. See notes 69-79 and accompanying text supra.
130. 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1973).
131. 78 Cal. App. 3d at 486, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
132. 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1973).
133. Id. at 633, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
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the contract can recover attorney's fees.'34 It is difficult to argue with
the result of these facts, but Section 1717 is not so clear. The history of
the statute gives no indication that the legislature ever contemplated a
non-party defendant might be sued as if he or she were a party.135 The
language relied on by the court is at best ambiguous when applied to
non-parties to the contract.
Another aspect of agency law which has not yet produced any Sec-
tion 1717 cases, but seems ripe for one, is in the area of franchising and
licensing. A single defendant, Arthur Murray, Inc., may be credited
with a large part of the law of franchisor liability on contracts in Cali-
fornia. So notorious were Arthur Murray's operations nationwide that
the New York legislature dispensed with the requirement of privity of
contract altogether for consumer suits against dance studio
franchisors. 136
In California, three separate suits were brought by students of de-
funct franchises for breach of contract and violations of the Dance
Act.' 37 In Nichols v. Arthur Murray, Inc. ,138 plaintiff established actual
agency by showing that the franchisor retained the right to control the
daily operation of the franchise. In Beck v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 39 re-
covery was based on ostensible agency. As a result of advertising for
the school, the repeated and prominent use of the Arthur Murray
name, and the lack of effective notice of independent ownership, plain-
tiff reasonably believed that the school was owned by Arthur Murray
and that the operators of the school were merely agents. The case pre-
dated Section 1717, but plaintiff recovered attorney's fees under the
Dance Act."4 Both cases were followed in Kuchta v. Allied Builders
Corp. ' 4 1 in which a construction franchisor was held liable for breach
of contract and fraud. The holding was based on both the "con-
trol/actual agency" theory of Nichols 42 and the "representa-
tion/ostensible agency" theory of Beck. 43
Considering the present size of the franchising industry, these cases
open up a substantial possibility for recovery by consumers who lose
their money after relying on a trade name. Consumer contracts with
134. Id.
135. See Enrolled Bill Memorandum, supra note 28.
136. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §394-d.
137. CAL. CIV. CODE §§1812.50-1812.68.
138. 248 Cal. App. 2d 610, 56 Cal. Rptr. 728 (1967). Accord, Porter v. Arthur Murray, Inc.,
249 Cal. App. 2d 410, 57 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1967).
139. 245 Cal. App. 2d 976, 54 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1966).
140. CAL. CIV. CODE §1812.62.
141. 21 Cal. App. 3d 541, 98 Cal. Rptr. 588 (1973).
142. Id. at 547, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
143. Id. at 547, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 591.
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franchise operations often include attorney's fee provisions, and the
consumer, if successful, can recover the fees under Section 1717. There
is also the danger, as yet not addressed in the cases, that an unsuccess-
ful consumer might have to pay the defendant franchisor's attorney's
fees if the agency is not established. While at least one writer has sim-
ply assumed that this would be the case,'" this is by no means certain.
C Corporations
Under some circumstances, the shareholders of a corporation may be
held liable for its debts under the corporate "alter ego" theory.'45 In
such a case, the plaintiff asserts that the corporation did not have a real,
separate existence at all, but was merely a vehicle for the personal busi-
ness of its owners.' 46 In Arnold v. Browne 47 the corporation was ad-
mittedly in default, but plaintiffs attempted to hold the shareholders
liable as well. In denying fees to the prevailing shareholder defendants,
the First District Court of Appeal, like the Second District in Bab-
cock, 48 found the meaning of Section 1717 "specific." However, while
the Babcock court construed the section as specifically providing for
attorney's fees for the defendant in this situation, the court in Arnold
came to the opposite conclusion. 
49
The debate between the Arnold and Babcock views regarding the
ability of non-parties to recover attorney's fees under Section 1717 con-
tinued until the California Supreme Court settled the question for the
most common fact pattern in Reynolds Metals Co. v. Alerson "' The
facts were similar to Arnold: a creditor benefitted by a unilateral attor-
ney's fee clause, an insolvent debtor corporation, and an unsuccessful
attempt to hold the shareholders personally liable. The court recog-
nized the ambiguity in language of the section. "[Tlhe terms 'parties'
and 'party' are ambiguous. It is unclear whether the Legislature used
the terms to refer to signatories or litigants."'' California has rejected
the idea that words have a "plain meaning" independent of the context
in which they are used.152 No clearer example can be found than the
opposite conclusions reached by the Courts of Appeal regarding the
144. Saxon, Recovery of Attorney's Fees by the Non-contracting Lefendant, 55 CAL. STATE B. J.
150, 153 (1980).
145. See generally N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §18 (2d ed. 1971).
146. Id. at 86.
147. 27 Cal. App. 3d 386, 103 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1972).
148. Babcock v. Omansky, 31 Cal. App. 3d 625, 107 Cal. Rptr. 512 (1973).
149. 27 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
150. 25 Cal. 3d 124, 599 P.2d 83, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1979).
151. Id. at 128, 599 P.2d at 85, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 3.
152. Estate of Russell, 69 Cal. 2d 200, 209, 444 P.2d 353, 359, 70 Cal. Rptr. 561, 567 (1968).
See generaly Stillwell v. State Bar, 29 Cal. 2d 119, 173 P.2d 313 (1946).
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"obvious" meaning of the word "party" in Section 1717.153 To resolve
the ambiguity, the Supreme Court examined the intent and purpose of
the statute.'5 4
Section 1717 was enacted to establish mutuality of remedy where
contractual provision makes recovery of attorney's fees available for
only one party ... and to prevent oppressive use of one-sided attor-
ney's fee provisions. . .. Its purposes require Section 1717 be inter-
preted to further provide a reciprocal remedy for a non-signatory
defendant, sued on a contract as if he were a party to it, when a
plaintiff would clearly be entitled to attorney's fees should he prevail
in enforcing the contractual obligation . . . Since [defendants]
would have been liable for attorney's feespursuant to thefeesprovi-
sion had plaintiff prevailed, they may recover attorney's fees pursu-
ant to Section 1717 now that they have prevailed. 155
Significantly, the holding in Reynolds Metals was based on an inter-
pretation derived from the legislative intent to "prevent the oppressive
use of one-sided attorney's fee provisions" and not on the questionable
interpretation in Babcock that the language of the statute required its
application to a non-party defendant. A clause may be unilateral or
reciprocal, and it may be drafted by the plaintiff or the defendant.15 6
These two variables yield four possible combinations and Reynolds
Metals addressed only one: a unilateral clause drafted by the plaintiff.
THE NON-PARTY DEFENDANT AND CIVIL CODE SECTION 1717
This section will examine the four possibilities identified above and
the applicability of Section 1717 to each one. For this discussion, a
basic set of facts is assumed: plaintiff claims that defendant is a party
to and liable on the contract; defendant claims that he or she is not; the
contract contains an attorney's fee provision covering the entire con-
tract,' 57 and there is no other applicable statute authorizing attorney's
fees. The outcome of any non-contract claim will not affect the result
and will therefore not be considered. For this discussion it is assumed
that liability of the original promissor is not in dispute, the only real
question being whether the defendant is a party.
153. Compare Arnold v. Browne, 27 Cal. App. 3d at 398, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 784, with Babcock
v. Omansky, 31 Cal. App. 3d at 633, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 518.
154. See generally R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES
242-43 (1975).
155. 25 Cal. 3d at 128, 599 P.2d at 85-86, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 3-4 (emphasis added).
156. "Drafting party" in this section means the party responsible for the inclusion of the
clause in the contract, and is usually the party presenting the other with a preprinted form. In a
three-cornered transaction, it may be that neither plaintiff nor defendant is responsible for the
clause. See generally Wilson v. Lewis, 106 Cal. App. 3d 803, 165 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1980) (reciprocal
clause, drafted by real estate broker).
157. See text accompanying notes 80-99 supra.
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In all four cases, if the plaintiff wins on the contract claim, a non-
party problem does not exist. Plaintiff has proven that defendant is a
party and can recover under the contract or under the statute,'58 but
only to the contract limit, if any.'5 9
A. Case 1: Unilateral Clause, Drafted by Plaintff
This is the most common case, as illustrated by Arnold, Babcock,
and Reynolds Metals. The plaintiff has drafted the contract and has
included a provision requiring the other party to pay the plaintiffs at-
torney's fees in the event of litigation. The other party defaults and is
insolvent; plaintiff seeks to hold defendant liable. If defendant wins,
Reynolds Metals is directly on point. The plaintiff used a superior bar-
gaining position to extract a unilateral attorney's fee provision for his
or her own benefit, and, if the statute is not applied, can coerce the
defendant into an unfavorable settlement due to the unequal attorney's
fee position. This was precisely the evil that the legislature sought to
prevent.160
B. Case 2: Reciprocal Clause, Drafted by Plaintif
A different case arises when the plaintiff has made the clause recipro-
cal. Despite the contrary holdings in Benefcial Standard and Sain v.
Silvestre, the California Supreme Court has indicated that Section 1717
does not apply to reciprocal clauses. 16' Depending on the specific lan-
guage of the attorney's fee provision, defendant may be able to recover
by the same logic used to deny attorney's fees to a losing party in Ecco-
Phoenix.162 Defendant may be able to argue that the clause covers
non-parties who could be sued as third-party beneficiaries of the con-
tract. The court may bend over backwards, as it did in Ecco-Phoenix,
to find such a construction to avoid an inequitable result.
63
C Case 3: Recprocal Clause, Drafted by Defendant
The third case arises when the defendant is the drafter of the provi-
sion. This situation may arise when a franchisee or closely-held corpo-
ration has become insolvent, as illustrated in the Arthur Murray cases,
158. T.E.D. Bearing Co. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 38 Cal. App. 3d 59, 63-64, 112 Cal. Rptr.
910, 914 (1974).
159. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
160. Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 597, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 (1971).
161. See note 77 and accompanying text supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 18-22 supra.
163. See Ecco-Phoenix Electric Corp. v. Howard J. white, Inc., 1 Cal. 3d 266, 272, 461 P.2d
33, 36, 81 Cal. Rptr. 849, 852. Cf., Canal-Randolph Anaheim, Inc., v. Wilkoski, 78 Cal. App. 3d
477, 144 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1978) (court refused to construe lease fee provision as protecting assignee
sued on privity of estate only).
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and the consumers who signed the contracts provided by the franchisor
or corporate shareholder/officer seek to hold the defendant personally
liable.16
4
This defendant does not have the advantage of the principle that am-
biguities are construed against the drafter. This principle was impor-
tant in Ecco-Phoenix and would bolster the third-party beneficiary
argument of the defendant in Case 2. The "equitable estoppel" argu-
ment suggested in Pas v. Hill165 is inapplicable because an essential
element of estoppel, reliance, is missing. Defendant has not acted in
reliance on plaintiffs claim of agency or alter ego. Quite the contrary,
defendant is fighting it.. Defendant's inability to recover attorney's fees
in this case is especially unjust since the defendant has compiled with
what the legislature has indicated is the public policy by making the
clause reciprocal. To provide attorney's fees in this situation by judi-
cial decision would require either an expansion of Section 1717 far be-
yond its intent or a complete disregard of the Code of Civil Procedure
Section 1021.166 Legislative action is in order to correct this anomaly.
D. Case 4: Unilateral Clause, Drafted by Defendant
The final case is similar to Case 3 and will arise out of the same
situation, except that the drafter has made the clause unilateral. It
would be a curious result indeed if the person who imposed a unilateral
clause on a weaker party in an Arthur Murray-type case could recover
attorney's fees while the drafter of a reciprocal clause in the same situa-
tion could not. Yet that would be the result if Reynolds Metals were
blindly applied to this case without regard to the basis for its holding.
The policy considerations underlying the holding in Reynolds Metals
do not support the awarding of attorney's fees in this situation. Section
1717 was intended to remove the advantage of unilateral attorney's fee
provisions. Nevertheless, they continue to be a common feature of ad-
hesion contracts.' 67 Apparently attorneys continue to draft them in
unilateral terms to intimidate parties who are unaware of Section
1717.168 The judicial process remains a greater mystery to the bulk of
consumers, and it is doubtful that more than a few have ever heard of
Section 1717. A unilateral clause provides an additional weapon to
threaten the consumer into settlement when he or she is unaware of the
reciprocal right. To provide an additional incentive for unilateral
164. See notes 136-144 and accompanying text supra.
165. 87 Cal. App. 3d 521, 535-36, 151 Cal. Rptr. 98, 108 (1978).
166. See text accompanying notes 67-79 supra.
167. Coast Bank v. Holmes, 19 Cal. App. 3d 581, 596-97, 97 Cal. Rptr. 30, 39 (1971).
168. See, e.g., CAL. FoRMs §22:280 (1975) (form book rental agreement fee provision).
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clauses by giving the people responsible for them greater rights than
they would have had under the contract or would have had under a
reciprocal clause would be contrary to the purpose of the statute, not
supportive of it.
The broad construction in Reynolds Metals was built on the equita-
ble foundation laid in International Industries and Ecco-Phoenix. The
general rules of equity therefore apply. One of these principles is that
one must come to the court of equity with "clean hands."' 69 The doc-
trine is not limited to fraud, crime, or even conduct which would form
the basis for a cause of action. Any unconscionable conduct on the part
of the person seeking the aid of equity is sufficient to deny relief.'
70
The defendant seeking attorney's fees in this situation comes before the
court claiming that it would be unfair and inequitable if the plaintiff
should be able to recover attorney's fees while the defendant cannot.
Yet that is precisely the way he or she wrote the contract. But for Sec-
tion 1717, the defendant's corporation or franchisee would be able to
recover attorney's fees from the plaintiff while the plaintiff would have
no such right.
The section does not necessarily apply, by its own terms, to non-
party defendants.' 7 ' When the court finds that the defendant was re-
sponsible for the inclusion o f the unilateral attorney's fee clause, there
is no equitable reason for rescuing the defendant from the exact predic-
ament he or she sought to impose on the plaintiff.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE
California law on attorney's fees in contract cases has made great
strides in the past two decades, providing a system based far more on
the equities of the situation and far less on the bargaining power of the
parties. Revision is required, however, to make the law consistent and
to clarify remaining uncertainties.
.4 Code of Civil Procedure Section 1021
Section 1021 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the basic provision for
recovery of attorney's fees. This section should be amended to provide
uniform rules for recovery as costs rather than as damages and a uni-
form definition of prevailing party. The legislature should also con-
sider reversing the present rule that a party appearing in propria
persona cannot recover the reasonable value of his or her own services.
169. Katz v. Karlsson, 84 Cal. App. 2d 469, 474, 191 P.2d 541, 544 (1948).
170. Id.
171. Reynolds Metals, Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 128, 599 P.2d 83, 85, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 3
(1979).
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This rule creates a unilateral attorney's fee situation in spite of Section
1717.
To correct the inequities and problems discussed, the present section
should be redesignated subsection a) and be followed by these subsec-
tions:
b) When a party is entitled to attorney's fees by statute or contract,
the fees shall be recovered as costs. Fees shall not be recovered when
an action is voluntarily dismissed.
c) When different parties prevail on different issues in a case, the
court shall apportion attorney's fees among the issues and award them
accordingly. The fees so apportioned need not be in proportion to the
monetary value of the issues, but shall represent the actual costs of the
litigation.
d) When an otherwise prevailing party is denied costs or required
to pay costs under Sections 998 or 1025 of this code 72 that party shall
not recover attorney's fees. When a party may be denied costs under
sections 1031(b) or 1032(d) of this code, the court shall award only so
much in attorney's fees as would have been reasonable had the case
been tried in the appropriate lower court. 173
e) A party otherwise entitled to attorney's fees appearing inpropria
persona shall recover the value of his or her own services.
The allocation of fees among issues is the only practical way to han-
dle cases like National Computer where an award of attorney's fees for
the entire case might turn on an otherwise insignificant issue.' 74 This is
not to be confused with the allocation of fees between different causes
of action sharing a common issue that was rejected in Reynolds Met-
als.175
B. Civil Code Section 1717
The first paragraph of the present section should be redesignated
subsection a). The phrase "enforce the provisions of such contract"
172. California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 998 and 1025 provide a method of shifting
liability for costs by making an offer or depositing an amount not in dispute in court.
173. California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1031(b) and 1032(d) provide for discretion-
ary denial of costs when plaintiff recovers a judgment for an amount within the jurisdiction of a
lower court. "Reasonable" fees in small claims may well be zero.
174. See text accompanying notes 103-113 supra.
175. Attorney's fees were incurred in defending three causes of action, only one of which
involved a contract with an attorney's fee provision. The "alter ego" issue was common to all
three claims and was the major issue of the case.
Attorney's fees need not be apportioned when incurred for representation on an issue
common to both a cause of action in which fees are proper and one in which they are not
allowed. All expenses incurred with respect to the alter ego issue.., qualify for the
award.
Reynolds Metals, Co. v. Alperson, 25 Cal. 3d 124, 129, 599 P.2d 83, 86, 158 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (1979).
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should be followed by "or any portion thereof."' 76 "[A]warded to one
of the parties" should be expanded by adding "or more" after "one."
This extension of Section 1717 to reciprocal clauses is necessary to
cover non-party defendants sued on contracts with such clauses.17 7 The
second paragraph should be redesignated b), but not changed. The
definition of "prevailing party" can be deleted, along with those in Sec-
tions 1811.1 and 2983.4, having been dealt with in Section 1021, supra.
The following subsections can then be added:
c) "Reasonable attorney's fees," for the purpose of this section, are
limited to the maximum either party could recover under the contract.
d) Any person who
1) is sued on a contract as if a party to that contract; or
2) owns property subject to or alleged to be subject to an
encumbrance and such encumbrance includes a provision for at-
torney's fees incurred to enforce the encumbrance may recover
attorney's fees under subsection a) of this section as if a party to
the original agreement.
e) Unilateral attorney's fees provisions are against the public policy
of this state. Recovery of attorney's fees by a person responsible for the
inclusion of such a provision in a contract shall be limited to the terms
of the contract, strictly construed, and shall not include any right under
this section or Sections 1811.1 or 2983.4 of this code. "Unilateral attor-
ney's fee provisions" include, but are not limited to,
1) provisions which create a right to attorney's fees for one party
but not the other, and
2) provisions which create a right to attorney's fees incurred in ac-
tions to enforce the rights of one party but do liot so provide for actions
to enforce the rights of the other party or only for an insubstantial por-
tion of the rights of the other party.
CONCLUSION
Civil Code Section 1717 was a significant step forward in relieving
the oppression of the consumer via adhesion form contracts. The courts
have generally implemented it consistently with its intent, but questions
remain in the applicability of the statute to reciprocal clauses, succes-
sors to interests in land, clauses applicable to only part of the contract,
and non-party defendants responsible for unilateral clauses. The above
recommendations, if enacted, will clear up these uncertainties. In addi-
176. This addition would reverse Sciarrotta v. Teaford Constr. Co., 110 Cal. App. 3d 444, 167
Cal. Rptr. 889 (1980). See text accompanying notes 80-99 supra.
177. See text accompanying notes 161-166 supra.
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tion, they will provide greater uniformity in the area of attorney's fee
recovery and prevent the drafters of adhesion contracts from evading
the intent of Section 1717 by limiting the scope of the attorney's fee
clause. Finally, the recommendations would withdraw the protection
of Section 1717 from the very people whose unconscionable practices
made the section necessary to begin with: those who would misuse lib-
erty of contract to deny others an equal opportunity to present their
case in a court of law.
Kent S. Scheidegger
